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FinTech and RegTech: Enabling Innovation while Preserving Financial 
Stability 
by 
Douglas W. Arner*, Dirk A. Zetzsche**, Ross P. Buckley*** and Janos N. Barberis**** 
 
The exponential growth of FinTech is forcing financial regulators around the world to 
reconsider how best to balance the key regulatory objectives of innovation and financial 
stability. This paper considers the potential role of RegTech and smart regulation in 
facilitating this balancing act. Financial regulators have begun to use regulatory 
sandboxes in many parts of the world to achieve this end, however there is a clear 
opportunity for a further shift towards datafied and digitized regulation. 
 
Introduction 
Technology is transforming finance around the world at an unprecedented rate, offering 
new opportunities but also raising new risks. Financial regulators must develop new 
approaches to regulation, including through the use of technology, to balance the benefits 
of innovation and economic development with financial stability and consumer protection.  
Prior to the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, financial innovation was generally viewed 
very positively by financial markets and many regulators, particularly those from major 
financial jurisdictions such as the US and UK. This often led to laissez-faire, deregulatory 
approaches to regulation particularly in global institutional markets. Post-Crisis financial 
regulatory reforms have seen a reversal of this approach – the regulatory pendulum has 
now arguably swung to the other extreme. Into this environment, rapid technological 
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evolution combined with post-Crisis regulatory changes have spurred the development of 
financial technology (“FinTech”). 1  FinTech includes new startups, established 
technological and e-commerce companies (which we call “TechFins”) 2  as well as 
incumbent financial firms. FinTech promises innovation and economic growth through 
disruption of traditional financial services businesses, yet it also poses a major challenge 
to the post-Crisis regulatory paradigm.  
As FinTech has gained in significance, financial regulators have been forced to consider 
how to balance the traditional regulatory objectives of financial stability and consumer 
protection with the objectives of growth and innovation. This balancing has been a 
particular challenge in the conservative post-Crisis regulatory environment, which has 
largely been focused on preventing disruption as opposed to encouraging it in the way 
hoped by many FinTechs. The result so far is a process of regulatory innovation, which 
includes the use of technology (“RegTech”) 3  and changes to existing regulatory 
frameworks such as the establishment of regulatory sandboxes.  
We have so far seen four possible regulatory approaches to FinTech innovation: (1) doing 
nothing (which could be a restrictive or a permissive approach, depending on the context); 
(2) flexibility and forbearance (under which existing rules are relaxed in specific contexts); 
(3) restricted experimentation (e.g sandboxes or piloting); and (4) regulatory development 
(in which new regulations are developed to cover new activities and entrants). We argue 
that what is needed is “smart regulation,” a distinct  approach that transcends these boxed 
ways of thinking and uses each of them, and more, in an integrated approach to balancing 
the need for stability and the promotion of innovation and consumer protection.  
Smart regulation is the result of a comprehensive review of existing regulatory systems in 
light of rebalanced objectives and emerging technology. From the standpoint of application 
of technology to regulation (“RegTech”), it involves digitization of systems which in turn 
supports application of advanced analytical approaches to yield better regulation. It also 
involves the development of new financial infrastructure, including digital identification 
systems and frameworks for payments and other transactions. Beyond RegTech, smart 
regulation requires analysis of existing systems in order to build entirely new approaches 
which take into account balanced objectives of economic development, financial stability 
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and consumer protection. Smart regulation requires rethinking regulation in all its forms in 
order to develop new approaches and new systems in order to support the new form of 
financial system which is rapidly evolving.  
Financial Innovation and the Global Financial Crisis 
The Global Financial Crisis challenged the generally positive view of the role of innovation 
in financial services, particularly that embodied in product innovations such as 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Despite the experiences of the Crisis, financial and 
technological innovation matters deeply, and regulators need to perform a balancing act 
between preserving stability, protecting consumers, and promoting innovation. On the one 
hand, financial and technological innovation can enhance market efficiency by reducing 
transaction and financial intermediation costs.4 In particular, it can serve as a catalyst for 
providing new solutions to long-standing problems, including financial exclusion, the 
quality of consumer decision-making,5 agency costs at the front-end of financial services, 
and high compliance costs.6 
On the other hand, financial and technological innovation also brings new risks. Financial 
innovations like derivatives and securitization have important roles in risk management 
and financial resource allocation, yet they also played a key role in facilitating the Global 
Financial Crisis.7 
Among the main financial regulatory mandates, two were of key importance as the 2008 
Crisis unfolded: first, consumer protection (particularly retail clients, investors and 
depositors);8 and second, financial market stability as a whole.9 While the micro dimension 
of regulation focuses on individual institutions, the systemic or macro perspective looks at 
the impact of counterparty interrelationships and/or systemically important financial 
institutions (SIFIs), often described under the rubric of too-connected-to-fail or too-big-
too-fail. 10  In the wake of the Crisis, there has been a major process of reregulation, 
designed in particular to address both micro and macro problems. 
The Evolution of FinTech 
FinTech emerged against this backdrop of post-Crisis regulation. 
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Technology and finance have had a very long relationship, with each responding to 
developments in the other over an extended evolutionary process.11 This evolution can be 
characterized over the past 150 years into four major eras, but in the last 10 years, the pace 
of change in both finance and technology has moved more rapidly than ever before, 
resulting in the emergence of a new term and era: FinTech.12  
This new era of FinTech is marked by the speed of change and the range of new entrants 
in the financial sector. FinTech startups  and IT and e-commerce TechFins13 all compete 
with traditional financial institutions across developing, emerging and developed 
markets.14 In this context, there are new opportunities for innovation and growth, but also 
new challenges, particularly for regulators. Regulators must find a way to  prevent 
destructive disruption while also encouraging and supporting innovative disruption. 
FinTech: Furthering Innovation by Regulation or Competition?  
One principal effect of the Crisis has been a very cautious regulatory approach to 
innovation, particularly in light of concerns that regulatory capture by large financial 
institutions was a factor which contributed to the crisis. However, the rapid evolution of 
FinTech in the past decade, increasing policy pressure to re-start economic growth (e.g. the 
JOBS Act in the United States and the deregulatory priorities of the Trump 
administration), 15  and an international agenda to foster financial inclusion 16  have 
combined to bring pressure to bear on regulators to support innovation, particularly digital 
disruption.  
This requires regulators to balance support for innovation with their core regulatory 
mandates of systemic stability and consumer protection. Four approaches have so far 
emerged to this challenge. 
The first approach involves doing nothing: either by intent or otherwise. Doing nothing can 
involve simply not regulating FinTech and could be characterized as a permissive or 
laissez-faire approach. China, especially before 2015, is often highlighted as  a leading and 
highly-successful example of this approach.17 This may be beneficial for innovation and 
development but also brings risks, as in the Chinese example. Doing nothing however can 
also simply involve requiring FinTech firms to comply with the general framework of 
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financial regulation as it applies to traditional participants, often with a restrictive result. 
This approach may protect against risk at the cost of stifling innovation. This is the 
approach of most jurisdictions to date. 
Second, regulators can choose to allow certain amounts of flexibility on a case-by-case 
basis. This approach can be classified as one based on forbearance. 18  Indeed, many 
regulators facing innovation, and equipped by a legislature with a mandate which allows 
consideration of economic benefits, have granted restricted licenses and partial exemptions 
for innovative firms so that the regulator can acquire sufficient data and experience with 
innovation. Many regulators have pursued this approach rather than following China’s lead 
of initially not regulating innovative firms, and only stepping in with regulation after the 
innovations had reached a certain size and significance.19  
Third, regulators can provide a structured context for experimentation—by instituting a 
regulatory sandbox or (as in China since 2015) adopting structured piloting exercises. 
While a new term in financial services, the sandbox concept is by no means novel, with its 
origins in computer science. In finance, a regulatory sandbox refers to a regulatory “safe 
space” for financial technology services. At a basic level, the sandbox creates an 
environment for businesses to test products with less risk of being “punished” by the 
regulator. In return, regulators require applicants to incorporate appropriate safeguards.20 
There are currently over twenty sandboxes announced or in operation globally. 21 
Regulatory sandboxes seek to support competitive innovation in financial markets. 
Eligibility to enter a sandbox is standardized and publicized, thus requiring market 
participants to articulate their added-value in a pre-defined format.22 This is cost-effective 
for participants and resource-effective for regulators. Sandboxes bring an important 
dimension of transparency to ad hoc forbearance or dispensation practises, and allow easier 
comparison among potential entrants to the sandbox. 
However, sandboxes, while providing transparency in the entry criteria and processes, are 
very much human-driven and analogue in their monitoring. Sandboxes as currently 
conceived are not scalable – the current 25 participants in the UK Financial Conduct 
Authority sandboxes are insignificant compared to the large number of licenced market 
participants in the United Kingdom (over 56,000 firms).23 For this reason, sandboxes need 
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to be made smarter and equipped to self-monitor the activity within them, as opposed to 
just being a process-driven application method to gain entry, typically for a limited time, 
to a regulatory safe space. 
Fourth, a formal approach could be adopted, in which existing regulations are reformed or 
new regulations are developed in order to provide a more appropriate and balanced 
framework for new entrants and new activities. This has been the approach in a number of 
jurisdictions, but so far limited to specific areas such as crowdfunding, payments or P2P 
lending activities. 
Support for competitive innovation in financial markets is certainly not the exclusive 
preserve of developed jurisdictions impacted by the Global Financial Crisis, such as the 
United States and United Kingdom. Financial innovation has been transformative in 
emerging markets such as China,24 India25 and Kenya,26 all of which are re-thinking their 
financial markets, and none of which has announced a regulatory sandbox initiative. 
China is often applauded for adopting a laissez-faire approach before proceeding to 
regulate. This approach allowed market participants to test without immediate 
repercussions from the regulator. In practice, this meant that, at least before 2015, China’s 
need for regulatory sandboxes was limited, as China itself at the time was essentially a 
national-level sandbox. However, China did not persist with its entirely laissez-faire 
approach. After new pooled products were issued by Alibaba Group, regulators woke up 
one morning to discover the world’s fourth largest ($90 billion) money market fund had 
grown within only nine months (and is now the world’s largest money market fund at $165 
billion27). This lack of initial visibility and regulatory market comprehension has pushed 
China to pursue a path of developing a new, comprehensive regulatory approach, one that 
is stricter but still more balanced and pro-innovation than in many other countries.28 
It comes as no surprise that innovation is less restricted in less regulated parts of the 
world.29 Even in the absence of prescriptive rules, regulation can weaken innovative forces, 
because establishing new, solution-driven, potentially innovative firms is more expensive 
in a strictly regulated environment than in an accommodative one. The above analysis 
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suggests that no single regulator has a monopoly on the best framework for innovation and 
regulatory sandboxes are not always the best addition to regulators’ toolkits. 
Some regulators understand their standard mandates of financial regulation—financial 
stability and consumer protection—to include furthering innovation, while others interpret 
their mandates more narrowly and will require an explicit mandate to further innovation. 
In April 2017, U.S. states represented by the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, 
challenged a FinTech special charter issued by the Office of Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC) on the grounds that the Office lacks a mandate to further innovation. The capacity 
of the OCC’s plans to charter FinTech companies as “special national banks” was 
challenged, inter alia, on the grounds that to do so exceeds the OCC’s statutory authority.30   
On balance, the express provision of the promotion of innovation in their mandate could 
be most useful—at least for financial centers that wish to compete by signaling regulatory 
flexibility to the market. Such messages are typically first issued by regulators establishing 
FinTech contact points31 or appointing FinTech officers.32 This is then often followed by 
the regulator initiating market meetings, discussions and consultations,33 and then in some 
jurisdictions establishing a sandbox. Indeed, the major contribution of a sandbox from a 
regulator’s perspective may lie, not in providing a typically highly restrictive safe space, 
but in its signalling function: communicating regulator flexibility towards innovative 
enterprises. 
It remains unclear as to what will comprise the best model in the future. In contrast to the 
pattern of the previous ten years, a positive, forward-looking regulatory momentum is 
building. Regulators in global financial centers have increasingly realized the potential 
benefits of FinTech for consumers and of RegTech for their primary mandates. They are 
also mindful of the potential harmful impact of excessive post-Crisis stringency on the 
competitiveness of incumbent financial intermediaries. An increasing number are 
beginning to experiment with novel approaches to regulation, seeking to unlock innovative 
potential while at the same time minimizing risks. Over time, market participants are able 
to identify the signs of regulatory interest in promoting innovation.  
RegTech 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3211708 
8 
 
In addition to the challenges of regulating FinTech, technology is playing an ever-
increasing role in regulation itself, particularly financial regulation. This ever-growing use 
of technology in finance is gradually putting pressure on regulators to move from 
regulations designed to control human behavior to regulation that seeks to supervise 
automated processes. 34  In other words, FinTech’s growth has elicited the need for 
RegTech.35 “RegTech” is a contraction of the terms “regulatory” and “technology,”36 and 
describes the use of technology, particularly information technology (IT), in the context of 
regulation, monitoring, reporting and compliance.37 
RegTech not only offers the potential for massive cost savings in meeting the compliance 
obligations of financial institutions, but more importantly offers the opportunity for 
regulators to perform their functions more effectively.38 The combination of FinTech and 
RegTech offers the potential to frame the development of a very different financial system 
from that which exists today. China offers perhaps the best example of the speed and 
magnitude of change possible, and India perhaps the best example of a transition currently 
in progress.39 
Smart Regulation 
The increasing commoditization of core technologies such as machine learning and 
artificial intelligence is opening a Pandora’s box of new FinTech and RegTech challenges, 
opportunities and solutions. Combining RegTech with new approaches to regulating 
FinTech presents the opportunity to consider regulation more broadly, an opportunity for 
smart regulation. 
FinTech Trends 
In designing financial regulation for the new financial sector which is emerging, three 
major market trends need to be taken into account. 
First, FinTech innovation is increasingly happening in diverging geographical clusters 
away from the traditional birthplaces of tech innovation such as Silicon Valley. This means 
that the monitoring of new technologies (or “emerging risks” as regulators may call them) 
is more difficult. For some perspective, over 100 million start-ups are established each 
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year40—although discovering and monitoring the potential risks which may emerge from 
such a large amount of ventures is a vexing challenge, more companies means more 
potential avenues for future growth as well as new risks.  
Second, the rapid growth of FinTech and RegTech businesses since 2016 demonstrates the 
increasingly critical role of technology.41 The self-learning nature of algorithms is rapidly 
transforming the scope and potential for automated regulation.42 
Third, the increasing amount of data in the world is fueling all tech industries,43  including 
RegTech, FinTech and TechFin. The potential actionable insights derived from data 
processing often extend beyond our current imagination but are also associated with 
emerging risks.44 
The regulatory context surrounding Fintech is fundamental to its regulation. Innovation 
requires smart regulation. 
Principles vs. Rules 
This new automated and proportionate regime should be built on shared fundamentals of 
financial regulation.  For example, while all regulators agree on the importance of 
combatting money laundering and financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) and international 
bodies are set up to ensure minimum standards set by the Financial Action Task Force,45 
details of implementing these recommendations vary among countries casting doubt on the 
efficiency of international coordination of AML/CFT rules.46 Lack of innovation in this 
area may thus be equally the result of insufficient harmonization and regulatory 
stringency. 47  To resolve this tension, regulators will need to focus on their broader 
mandates as defined by applicable legislation (i.e. consumer protection, financial stability, 
competition and prudential regulation) as opposed to attempting to apply overly rules-
based approaches which will inevitably trail the velocity of innovation and overly stretch 
regulatory resources. In other words, being ‘”technologically neutral”’ should not be used 
as an argument excusing regulators from the need to understand the impact of new 
technologies impacting processes (e.g. biometric identification for payments) or business 
models (e.g. alternative data credit scoring). Instead “technological neutrality” should 
mean that regulators do not seek to “regulate” technological innovations, but instead look 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3211708 
10 
 
at how technology enables a process with an outcome that ought to be subject to regulation 
(e.g. it is not automated investment that is the problem, but the risk of fraud or improper 
investment advice).48 
Competition vs. Innovation 
The key is not the regulation of technological innovation, but instead the regulation of 
competition in financial markets. Defining the boundaries of competition and financial and 
technological innovation is a challenge for regulators. The objective of smart regulation is 
not to force innovation but rather to lower entry barriers for innovative business models 
while keeping risk controls intact. 
Regulatory Innovation: Toward RegTech 
Where innovation is necessary to be pursued by law, however, is on the side of regulators. 
Traditional rule-based licensing schemes have raised minimum costs of doing business and 
stifled innovation. 
As competition spurs the arrival of new participants, regulatory capacity to experiment 
with new supervisory and reporting models increases. As the bargaining power of start-ups 
with regulators is disproportionality low compared to large established incumbent licensed 
enterprises, this provides regulators with the opportunity to engage in a sequenced reform 
process. Here, novel approaches beyond a heavy-handed supervisory process with 
punishment and sanctions as key instruments need to be developed. Those could include 
regulatory sandboxes, but also other means adequate to balance competition and innovation. 
Such approaches must consider the limits of traditional licensing and supervision which – 
besides raising minimum costs – include information asymmetry and delays in response. 
Novel regulatory approaches could strengthen supervision while opening the gates for new 
business ideas. In particular RegTech could function as key instrument: On the one hand, 
incumbent financial institutions and supervised entities could accept digitized monitoring 
and reporting. On the other hand, new market participants may trial digital regulation from 
the onset.  
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Combining a regulator’s openness to innovation with RegTech would free resources and 
enhance mutual learning. It would allow experimentation at the margin (this assumption is 
supported by the low numbers of firms in sandboxes) whilst the bulk of the industry is 
gradually brought to new standards via the digitization of regulatory requirements 
themselves (in short: RegTech). Risks incurred by unregulated, yet sandboxed (i.e. 
monitored) firms may be accepted – for the very reason that they could kick-start 
innovation while traditional regulation sets higher-than-desired barriers to innovation. 
Conclusion 
Regulation of technological innovation in finance must seek to balance competing 
objectives, especially of innovation, financial stability and consumer protection. This is a 
particular challenge for regulators ten years after the Global Financial Crisis as that crisis 
prompted a massive focus on financial stability and enhanced consumer protection. Against 
this background the great promise of FinTech has begun to alter regulatory attitudes and 
approaches to regulation of technological innovation. 
An increasing number of jurisdictions are considering how to best balance support for 
FinTech with the major regulatory objectives of financial stability and consumer protection. 
Some jurisdictions have done nothing, resulting in responses ranging from laissez-faire 
policies in the case of China to very restrictive ones in jurisdictions which require new 
entrants and activities to comply with existing regulatory systems. Others grant case-by-
case relaxations of existing rules for FinTech, while yet others are developing more 
structured sandbox approaches or other more comprehensive efforts to develop regulatory 
systems appropriate to FinTech.  
In addition to its impact on finance, technology is also increasingly impacting regulation 
in the form of RegTech, including by industry (for instance in the context of AML/CFT, 
reporting and risk management) and by regulators themselves increasingly using 
technology to enhance performance of their own mandates (for instance in the context of 
cybersecurity and macroprudential surveillance). Further, some countries (of which India 
is the leading example) and market participants (particularly in the context of blockchain 
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and distributed ledger technology) are beginning to consider how technology can be used 
to redesign financial systems.  
All in all, going forward, regulatory sandboxes are but one early step in a process that will 
embrace new smart—digitized and datafied—regulatory systems and a new smart approach 
to regulation that draws on all available tools, in a sequenced structured manner, to achieve 
the balancing act required of regulators.  
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